| ashu |
Posted
on 14-Mar-03 02:05 AM
ECON Centre for Economic Analysis (www.econ.no):
Economic Aspects of the Insurgency in Nepal
(Commissioned by DfID, UK)
(research and writing between April and June 2002, published January
2003)
Excerpts:
·A plausible estimate of the Maoists’ annual turnover is Rs 5bn ($
64million), which represents 1.5% of the GDP
The insurgency costs around 8-10% of the GDP
One week bandh can be estimated to 1/52 (almost 2%) of the annual
GDP or Rs 5.2bn
·
In mid-May 2002 government officials said that the infrastructure
losses amounted to about US$ 250 million
In 1996 Mid-Western districts such as Rolpa, Jajarkot and Salyan
had 25%, 19% and 17% of Kathmandu’s average income
·
Foreign exchange earnings from tourism peaked in 1998-99 at Rs
12.2bn or 3,6% of the GDP
Approx. 300,000 people are reported to have migrated to Kathmandu
Valley since 2000
·
The 2001 census reported that of 762.000 that had left their homes
in search of work, 589.000 had headed to India and 108.000 to the Middle
East (mostly to Qatar, about 70.000)
·
About 25% of Nepalese households receive remittances
·Currently, aid amounts to 5% to 6% of the GDP. However, it makes up
to 25% to 30% of the total government expenditure and has traditionally
financed more than 50% of the country’s development budget
Inequality, landlessness, and a general lack of opportunity
reinforced by complex systems of caste and related discriminatory patterns, have
provided sufficient motivation and support for the Maoist cause
· Addressing the conflicts causes:
· Attack poverty
· Support land reform
· Reduce debt burden of landless agricultural workers
· Rectify the inequality in access to public services and government employment
· Improve governance and reduce corruption
· Improve the human rights situation
· Even people with no sympathy for the movement do not appear to
think that financial gain motivates the leaders
·There is no evidence of Maoist involvement in the international
drug trade or similar international crime networks
·The country’s leaders depend on patronage for their political
survival, and the need to maintain fragile alliances is therefore a major
disincentive to political and economic reform
·
Patronage politics is a major obstacle to reform, but the ‘war
economy’ has yet to reach the extent where decision-makers will oppose peace
moves as a means of protecting their political gains
Related literature:
Addison, T., Murshed, S.M. 2001: From Conflict to Reconstruction:
Reviving the Social Contract. UNU/WIDER Discussion Paper No.48. Helsinki:
UNU/WIDER. Available online at
http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/htm
Addison, T., Le Billon, P., Murshed, S.M. 2001: Finance in Conflict
and Reconstruction. Journal of International Development, 13 (3),
pp.951-96
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